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This Article critiques Professor David Friedman’s article, Public 
Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, and sets forth an 
alternative view of the limits of anti-obesity public health paternalism.  
Specifically, it critiques Friedman’s classification of public health 
interventions based on how coercive the intervention is, and offers an 
alternative construct to analyze paternalistic public health interventions.  
The alternative approach, developed by Mark Hall, distinguishes between 
(1) “old” public health interventions that target specific pathogens or 
toxins, and (2) “new” public health interventions that target upstream 
behavioral risk factors and ecological factors.   
This Article then elaborates on the main example that Friedman uses 
to illustrate his claims about coercive public health paternalism, the New 
York City portion cap on sodas and other sugary drinks.  By comparing 
Friedman’s approach and the alternative approach, it shows that the latter 
better explains the case that invalidated the sugary drink portion cap rule.  
Moreover, this Article challenges Friedman’s assertion that the case is a 
death knell for public health paternalism.  Although the New York Board of 
Health now faces formidable challenges with respect to promulgation of 
new public health regulations, public health advocates in New York City 
can continue to advance the new public health goal of reducing obesity 
and diabetes in New York, by striving to foster greater political consensus 
regarding the legitimacy of that goal and the best means of achieving it.  
Beyond New York, in jurisdictions with less severe case law constraints on 
agency action, state and local public health agencies may have greater 
latitude to promulgate and enforce new public health regulations, 
including anti-obesity regulations. 
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The Limits of Anti-Obesity Public Health Paternalism: 
Another View 
KATHERINE PRATT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article comments on and critiques Professor David Friedman’s 
article, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism,1 and sets 
forth an alternative view of the limits of anti-obesity public health 
paternalism.  Part II of this Article discusses the approach that Friedman 
takes and the claims he makes, including the claim that coercive public 
health paternalism has peaked.  Part III critiques Friedman’s approach, 
which classifies public health interventions based on how coercive the 
intervention is, and offers an alternative construct to analyze paternalistic 
public health interventions.  The alternative approach, developed by Mark 
Hall, distinguishes between (1) “old” public health interventions that target 
specific pathogens or toxins, and (2) “new” public health interventions that 
target upstream behavioral risk factors and ecological factors.   
Part IV elaborates on the main example that Friedman uses to illustrate 
his claims about coercive public health paternalism, the New York City 
portion cap on sodas and other sugary drinks.  Comparing Friedman’s 
approach and the alternative approach, I show that the alternative approach 
better explains the case that invalidated the sugary drink portion cap rule.  
The defeat of the rule illustrates the perils of an executive agency acting 
unilaterally, without legislative approval, to adopt new public health 
interventions—especially in New York, where Boreali v. Axelrod2 imposes 
severe constraints on agency promulgation of new public health 
regulations.  I disagree with Friedman’s assertion that the portion cap case 
is a death knell for public health paternalism, however.  Although the New 
York Board of Health now faces formidable challenges with respect to 
promulgation of new public health regulations, public health advocates in 
New York City can continue to advance the new public health goal of 
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reducing obesity and diabetes in New York, by striving to foster greater 
political consensus regarding the legitimacy of that goal and the best 
means of achieving it.  In addition, the Board of Health retains the ability 
to promulgate and enforce old public health regulations—even highly 
coercive regulations—notwithstanding the portion cap case.  Beyond New 
York, in jurisdictions with less severe case law constraints on agency 
action, state and local public health agencies may have greater latitude to 
promulgate and enforce new public health regulations, including anti-
obesity regulations. 
II.  FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS 
In his article, Friedman makes both descriptive and normative claims 
regarding the limits of public health paternalism.  Although his primary 
focus is on anti-obesity public health paternalism, he argues that his 
conclusions are also broadly applicable to other types of public health 
paternalism.3   
But before turning to Friedman’s specific claims, note the rhetoric and 
approach that he uses to frame his argument.  His article is structured to set 
up a dichotomy between “Free Market Approaches” and “Paternalistic 
Approaches” to the obesity problem.4  Ultimately embracing a Libertarian 
perspective, he extolls the virtues of autonomy and the free market.5  In 
addition to drawing a distinction between highly coercive “hard” 
paternalism and less coercive “soft” paternalism,6 Friedman theorizes a 
paternalism spectrum with five categories, based on the degree to which 
the intervention is coercive.7  This “coercion spectrum” ranges from 
apaternalism, which eschews government interventions entirely in favor of 
private market solutions, to highly coercive government bans and 
mandates.8 
                                                                                                                          
3 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1753–65 (discussing trends related to marijuana, fluoride, and 
GMOs).   
4 Id. at 1721, 1726.   
5 Id. at 1767–68. 
6 Id. at 1696 & n.38. 
7 Id. at 1698–99. 
8 Friedman lists the categories and discusses them at length in Part II.B of his article.  The five 
intervention categories along the spectrum are: (1) “Libertarian or apaternali[sm]” (no government 
coercion is required because free markets and rational consumers with full information will address any 
potential harm to consumers); (2) “Weak-form debiasing” (government provides “raw statistical and 
factual information” to inform consumers of relevant data, which is a mild form of coercion); (3) 
“Strong-form debiasing” (government provides a “concrete instance of the occurrence” or “truthful 
narratives of harm” to illustrate potential harms, which is a stronger form of coercion but not an 
absolute constraint on consumer choices); (4) “Insulating strategies” (“government protects consumers 
by creating barriers to entry or hard-to-satisfy standards,” such as auto safety standards); and (5) 
“Outright bans and mandates” (government prohibits consumers from making harmful choices or 
requires harm-reducing action, in the strongest type of coercion).  Id.  
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Friedman states that the overall purpose of his article “is to assess the 
role of paternalism in public health and whether paternalism, particularly 
paternalism in its harder forms, has reached natural limits in terms of 
popular viability and practical effectiveness.”9  His main descriptive claim 
is that “[p]aternalism has peaked, for now, in the realm of public health 
regulation,”10 because the public rejects hard paternalism and soft 
paternalism is weak and ineffective.11  In other words, Friedman seems to 
acknowledge that loss of autonomy, through government coercion, might 
be warranted in some settings, but he expresses skepticism about the 
political viability and effectiveness of various public health paternalist 
interventions.   
Friedman recognizes that public health advocates may feel morally 
obligated to address the prevalence of obesity.12  Although he seems 
sympathetic to their goals of reducing obesity-related morbidity and 
mortality,13 he questions the need to intervene in free markets,14 as well as 
the political viability and effectiveness of public health interventions.15 
Friedman’s analysis includes a discussion of the role of free markets in 
the current obesity problem.  He notes that the increasing prevalence of 
obesity has been caused, at least in part, by consumers making their own 
“free choices” about which foods to consume.16  In other words, he 
believes that obesity is not a problem to the extent that obesity results from 
                                                                                                                          
9 Id. at 1710. 
10 Id. at 1694. 
11 Id. at 1769. 
12 Id. at 1768. 
13 See id. at 1712 (describing obesity as a “grave public health issue”).  Friedman is sympathetic 
to the “new” public health goal of reducing behavioral risk factors that significantly increase 
preventable disease and death—going as far as approving of less coercive and more coercive public 
health interventions to reduce preventable disease and death:  
Without a doubt, basic theories of both soft and hard paternalism would support 
[anti-obesity government interventions, such as] . . . regulatory, pricing, and health 
information mechanisms to substantially reduce salt and trans fats in prepared and 
packaged foods and to support research that can find effective strategies for 
modifying the other dietary, lifestyle, and metabolic risk factors that cause large 
numbers of premature deaths. 
Id. at 1712–13 (quoting Smoking, High Blood Pressure and Being Overweight Top Three Preventable 
Causes of Death in the U.S., HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 
27, 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/smoking-high-blood-pressure-overweight-
preventable-causes-death-us/) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 See id. at 1721 (positing that free choice itself may lead to “healthier decisions” in the battle 
against obesity). 
15 See id. at 1692 (describing a “general rejection of paternalism” of all kinds).  Since, in his view, 
hard paternalism is not politically viable and soft paternalism is weak and ineffective, Friedman argues 
that public health advocates might consider doing nothing to intervene in the obesity problem: 
“rejection of hard paternalism can lead regulators either to use strategies that preserve autonomy, or 
simply to do nothing to regulate personal choices.”  Id. 
16 Id. at 1721. 
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food consumers making the “choice” to be obese.17  In addition, he implies 
that there may be no need for the government to intervene with respect to 
obesity because the growth rate of obesity has leveled off, which in his 
view indicates a “natural” upper limit to obesity rates.18  He also observes 
that some free market responses, including food producer “voluntarism” 
(i.e., self-regulation) and the expanding diet and weight loss industry, have 
helped to reduce obesity rates.19  In his view, free markets and free choice 
could, at least in theory, solve the obesity problem by allowing people to 
satisfy their own preferences: 
The most powerful solution available that eschews all 
paternalism in favor of autonomy would be a natural 
collective preference to engage in proper caloric intake and 
energy discharge.  Though other factors like genetics might 
play into obesity, if these preferences, which would lead to 
better health and longer life expectancy, were dominant, free 
choice would lead to healthier decisions.20 
Friedman acknowledges, however, that the free market approach has 
not completely solved the public health obesity problem21 and concedes 
that government interventions may be warranted to respond to certain 
market failures, such as cognitive biases.22  In the obesity context, he 
singles out the “present bias,” which causes consumers to focus almost 
exclusively on the present consequences of actions and to ignore important 
future consequences.23  In his view, a government intervention to “debias” 
the present bias might be warranted, but only if the effectiveness of the 
intervention is established.24  Although the main “drivers” of obesity are 
known,25 Friedman doubts whether public health interventions can 
significantly reduce the complex problem of obesity.26 
In addition, the regulatory “full-court press” that Friedman believes is 
required to effectively respond to the obesity problem is, in his view, not 
                                                                                                                          
17 See id. at 1720 (arguing that reducing obesity requires “changing the way people of different 
ages, ethnic and racial backgrounds, and socioeconomic strata behave when they eat or drink”). 
18 Id. at 1713. 
19 Id. at 1722–24. 
20 Id. at 1721. 
21 See id. at 1726 (“The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the obesity problem has not been 
resolved by the combination of market forces and reactive intervention.”). 
22 See id. at 1726–27 (“Regulatory strategies can be designed to address a bias or error that 
interferes with decisions, leading people to make suboptimal or harmful choices.”). 
23 Id. at 1728. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 1714 
26 See id. at 1767 (“Undoubtedly, obesity presents a health crisis, but the complexity of the 
contributing dynamics renders the problem difficult to solve.”).   
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possible in the current environment.27  He discusses two specific obstacles 
to comprehensive anti-obesity public health interventions.  First, he argues 
that public opinion is trending in favor of autonomy and against public 
health paternalism, especially highly coercive, hard public health 
paternalism.28  He concludes that, where autonomy and public health 
paternalism are in conflict, Americans increasingly choose autonomy over 
improvements in public health.29  Second, he argues that, although soft 
paternalism might be more acceptable to the public, it would be ineffective 
or inefficient.30  In light of these two obstacles, Friedman concludes that 
anti-obesity public health paternalism cannot solve the obesity problem: 
“[R]ecent developments in public health regulation indicate that regulators 
may have a more limited range of tools going forward.  In particular, when 
looking at obesity . . . finding viable opportunities to change consumption 
and physical activity patterns through hard paternalism proves difficult, 
and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”31 
Friedman nonetheless expresses a normative claim that public health 
regulators may be morally obligated to continue their efforts to reduce 
obesity.32  Notwithstanding his pessimistic evaluation of anti-obesity 
public health paternalism, Friedman says that paternalists should not wave 
the white flag, because some strategies may be used to reduce obesity.33  
First, he counsels that public health paternalists can sneak public health 
paternalistic interventions (including hard paternalism) past the pro-
autonomy/anti-paternalistic public by crafting the paternalism so that the 
public does not notice that its autonomy has been constrained.34  Second, 
he concludes that government can coerce more effectively in “Zones of 
Control,” i.e., in food environments that are controlled by government, 
instead of private markets.35  He provides two examples of such zones of 
control: (1) schools (a zone of physical control); and (2) the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (a zone of legal control).36  Finally, he closes 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. at 1719. 
28 Id. at 1744, 1767–68. 
29 Id. at 1767; see also id. at 1756 (noting in the marijuana context that “the public increasingly 
desires to eschew paternalism in favor of more autonomy”). 
30 See id. at 1768–69 (arguing that efforts to reduce obesity “would be blocked due to the 
weakness of most soft paternalism strategies” and that “softer paternalistic efforts help debias at the 
margin, but simply do not provide the power to put significant dents in this Gordian problem”). 
31 Id. at 1693–94. 
32 See id. at 1769 (“Should regulators surrender?  Morally, that might not be an option.  Scientists 
and policymakers might have the obligation to play the paternal role, even if it proves unpopular.”).  
33 Id. at 1769–70. 
34 Id. at 1747–51.  Friedman argues that “regulators can intervene somewhat more easily” in 
“Zones of Intangibility,” which he describes as situations in which paternalistic constraints on 
autonomy are “not felt.”  Id. at 1747. 
35 Id. at 1744. 
36 Id. 
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with a broader normative claim that public health regulators “should 
pursue all solutions open to them” and rationalize their public health 
regulations with cost-benefit analyses.37 
III.  CRITIQUE OF FRIEDMAN’S APPROACH AND CLAIMS 
Friedman and I agree on some important issues.  For example, we 
agree that obesity is a major risk factor for most of the chronic diseases 
that impair the health and quality of life of Americans and shorten their 
lives.38  We also both agree that obesity is an important public health issue 
that policymakers in our country need to address.39  In addition, I share 
Friedman’s concerns about the increasing costs of obesity-related medical 
care40 and agree that obesity is a complex problem with many inputs.41 
He and I disagree about some of the facts of the obesity problem, 
however.  Friedman’s normative stance leads him to frame the facts in a 
way that, in my view, misrepresents the current reality of obesity in 
America.  As a Libertarian, Friedman highly values autonomy and free 
markets.42  He concedes, however, that his idealized free market would 
make Americans healthier only if we had a “collective preference” for 
healthy foods and exercise.43  In fact, we do not have such a collective 
                                                                                                                          
37 Id. at 1769 (emphasis added).  Friedman elaborates on this advice to regulators:  
Efforts should concentrate on the areas that science indicates would be the most 
impactful, and which would be the most practical to implement.   
For example, initiatives that harness the market and promote voluntarism in areas 
that could matter (e.g., the voluntary changes made by food retailers), would meet 
those criteria.  Debiasing initiatives that prove effective while preserving autonomy 
might prove weaker, but also could add up if enough of them were pressed.  
Opportunities to deploy hard paternalism should be sought with care, so as to 
minimize the perception that the regulators are usurping a tangible choice or are 
treading beyond the zone normally ceded to regulators.  These opportunities may 
prove few, but if sought and pressed aggressively, they may have powerful effect. 
Though the opportunities for deploying paternalism effectively in the public health 
arena may prove limited, they do exist.  If regulators minimize the perception that 
they are reducing autonomy, perhaps the public might give more slack to initiatives 
that tread on the border. 
Id. 
38 See id. at 1712 (noting obesity is the “third leading stand-alone risk factor” for preventable 
deaths per year). 
39 See id. (noting that “[w]ithout a doubt, basic theories of both soft and hard paternalism would 
support interventions” to respond to obesity, which is “a grave public health issue.”). 
40 See id. at 1714 (“[M]edical costs attributable to obesity rose from $78.5 billion in 1998 to $147 
billion by 2008.”). 
41 See id. at 1710 (“[O]besity presents perhaps the biggest and most complex public health 
challenge facing regulators.”). 
42 See supra text accompanying notes 5, 16–20. 
43 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1721. 
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preference; at least in the current food environment, we have quite the 
opposite collective preference.  Our innate preferences for sugar, fat, and 
salt in our diet conferred a survival advantage in a prior time, in which 
food sometimes was scarce, and our tastes led us to consume a varied diet 
of whole foods that provided healthy micronutrients as well as 
macronutrients.44  In the current food environment, however, sugars and 
fats occur not just in whole foods, but also in highly concentrated form in 
processed food, much of which tastes quite delicious, but is highly caloric 
and has little or no nutritional value; thus, our hard-wired tastes are 
maladaptive in today’s food environment.45 
Food markets suffer from various types of market failures, which may 
warrant government intervention.46  For example, government can respond 
to the market failure of “incomplete information” by mandating disclosure 
or by compiling the missing information and disseminating it.47  Friedman 
characterizes the provision of calorie counts for away-from-home foods 
(e.g., food served in fast food restaurants and sit-down restaurants) as 
“paternalism,”48 but I do not see it as such.  Weight conscious food 
consumers must be able to determine the calorie counts for the food they 
eat.  They can discern taste, price, value, and other important aspects of 
foods; in the absence of calorie information, restaurants and food 
producers compete on the aspects that consumers can discern, resulting in 
increased calories in such foods.49  This missing calorie information creates 
a market failure that justifies government intervention; regulations and 
laws that mandate the provision of calorie counts benefit consumers who 
want the information but otherwise cannot get it.  Consumers who are not 
concerned about calorie counts ignore them.  Mandating information that 
consumers want, to determine their own preferences, does not fit 
Friedman’s definition of paternalism, which is implicitly “other-
                                                                                                                          
44 Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Arguments for Antiobesity Soda 
Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 99 (2012). 
45 See id. (“In an environment in which foods high in fat and sugar are plentiful, ubiquitous, and 
cheap, however, these fast and frugal heuristics lead to systematic decision-making errors, obesity, 
chronic disease, and reduced well-being.”). 
46 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 83 (1986) (explaining that 
government can adopt market-corrective interventions to respond to market failures). 
47 Id. at 90–91. 
48 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1733 (characterizing mandatory calorie disclosures as “soft 
paternalism”).   
49 See JAYACHANDRAN N. VARIYAM, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NUTRITION LABELING IN THE FOOD-
AWAY-FROM-HOME SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 2 (2005), available                                               
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/err4.aspx#.UzG07q1dVOw 
(“Foods prepared away from home contain more calories per eating occasion . . . and are higher in total 
fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol and lower in dietary fiber, calcium, and iron on a per-calorie basis 
than food prepared at home.”); see also Devin Alexander, Restaurant Shockers: A Culinary Insider 
Reveals 7 Ways Chefs Sabotage Your Diet When You Go Out to Eat, SHAPE, Oct. 2004, at 198 
(discussing “common restaurant practices” that add hidden fat and calories to restaurant foods). 
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regarding.”50 
In the context of food markets, internalities are another prominent type 
of market failure.  “Internalities” are costs, which are incurred by different 
“selves” at different points in time and result in inadvertent harm to self 
over time.51  Internalities typically result from cognitive biases and 
heuristics.52  Friedman singles out “present bias” as “the primary cognitive 
bias” that is implicated in the prevalence of obesity.53  One problem with 
his discussion of present bias is that empirical evidence demonstrates that 
common sense measures to debias often fail.54  In addition, present bias is 
but one of many biases and heuristics that affect food and beverage 
consumption and contribute to obesity.  His single-minded focus on 
present bias oversimplifies the complex processes that are involved in 
eating “decisions.”  In a previous article, I discussed an entire catalogue of 
biases and heuristics, many of which are quite deliberately exploited by 
food producers.55  The exploitation of consumer biases and heuristics by 
the food industry raises concerns about the role of the food industry in the 
obesity epidemic. 
Friedman and I both regard food producers as important players in the 
resolution of the obesity problem in America, but we disagree about what 
it will take to encourage food producers to make their products healthier on 
a grand scale.  In his discussion of the role of free markets in obesity, 
Friedman characterizes the food industry in an unrealistically beneficent 
fashion.56  His application of the terms “paternalism” and “voluntarism” to 
food industry self-regulation57 seems oxymoronic to me.  Paternalism 
implies a benevolent concern and intention for the well-being of others.58  
                                                                                                                          
50 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1769 (“[P]aternalism [is] the ‘interference with a person’s liberty 
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or 
values of the [other] person being coerced.’” (quoting Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 
64, 65 (1972))). 
51 See Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 1263, 1292–93 (2001) (discussing time-inconsistent preferences of present and future selves 
and estimating the internal costs of smoking cigarettes). 
52 See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 44, at 94–103 (discussing internalities in the context of making 
decisions about foods). 
53 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1720. 
54 See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 272–
75 (2008) (concluding that efforts to debias by improving consumers’ financial literacy can backfire, 
leading to worse decision making). 
55 Pratt, supra note 44, at 100–06. 
56 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722 (arguing that food industry “voluntarism,” to adopt anti-
obesity measures, “might emerge out of sheer private paternal goodwill”). 
57 Id.  
58 Friedman includes this aspect of paternalism when referring to an encyclopedia’s example of 
paternalism: “a lifeguard presents a natural example of an omniscient, benevolent decision maker 
responsible for public and individual welfare.”  Id. at 1697 n.41 (emphasis added) (citing Paternalism, 
NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Paternalism#Soft_vs._hard
_paternalism (last updated Apr. 2, 2008)). 
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If the food industry adopts measures that might improve the well-being of 
others, but takes that action for a “selfish,” defensive, profit-maximizing 
reason, that action may be a free market response, but does not seem to fit 
within the concept of paternalism.  Corporations exist primarily to 
maximize corporate profits, not to paternalistically care for the 
corporation’s customers in ways that reduce corporate profits.59  Corporate 
advertising may create the illusion that corporations care for us (e.g., “We 
Do It All for You”), but those messages are merely marketing gimmicks 
that are designed to manipulate us into buying certain products;60 that is 
what for-profit corporations do, for good or ill.  On that basis, I disagree 
with Friedman’s assertion that food industry voluntarism to reduce obesity 
can result from “sheer private paternal goodwill.”61  I agree with him, 
however, that industry self-regulation “may simply be good for business[] 
or . . . designed to pre-empt regulation.”62   
Unlike many public health advocates, who cast the food industry in the 
permanent role of arch villain in the obesity epidemic narrative,63 I am of 
the view that the food industry could be part of the solution to the obesity 
problem—but only if legislation or regulations change the legal landscape 
so that meaningful self-regulation is in the economic best interests of the 
industry and its shareholders.  I agree with Critical Realists that, in the 
current environment, food producers have every incentive to exploit 
consumers’ cognitive biases and heuristics to encourage consumers to buy 
more of their products.64  Consumer behavior does not always entail as 
much choice as Friedman would have us believe, or even as much choice 
as we all tend to believe we have.  To date, left to their own devices, food 
producers have competed primarily based on taste, price, shelf life, and 
convenience, with no regard for the health consequences of their 
products.65  The result is that Lunchables and Kraft Macaroni & Cheese 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1645, 1689 (2004) (“In the United States, norms and laws lead corporations to pursue a common single 
interest—profit maximization—and, in turn, the shared interests of encouraging markets, preventing 
profit-restricting regulation, and supporting a conception of human behavior that enhances revenues.”). 
60 See id. at 1709 (reciting various food industry slogans that are designed to create the 
dispositionalist illusion, in the minds of exploited foods consumers, that they are in control of their own 
food purchasing decisions and the impression that the industry exists solely to serve consumers). 
61 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722. 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini & David Gregorio, Personal Health in the Public Domain: Reconciling 
Individual Rights with Collective Responsibilities, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2014) (“[T]he 
contemporary discourse about food preferences and lifestyle is significantly skewed by an industry that 
benefits from the sale of items, regardless of the nutritional peril consumption poses to individuals . . . .  
The burdens of poor diets visited upon individuals, households, or communities are negligibly borne by 
the parties who encourage such consumption practices.”). 
64 See Benforado et al., supra note 59, at 1694 (noting sales tactics that exploit biases for hot 
meals or that appeal to “patriotic impulses”). 
65 MICHAEL MOSS, SALT, SUGAR, FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US, at xiii–xiv (2013).    
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have become staples in the American diet.66  Bob Drane, one of the 
original developers of Lunchables, who now lectures on the role of the 
food industry in the obesity problem, provided this recipe for success to 
business school students: 
Discover what consumers want to buy, and give it to them 
with both barrels.  Sell more, keep your job!  How do 
marketers often translate these “rules” into action on food?  
Our limbic brains love sugar, fat, salt (scarce and high 
energy).  So, formulate products to deliver these.  Perhaps 
add low cost ingredients to boost profit margins.  Then 
“supersize” to sell more (# users x amount/user).  And 
advertise/promote to lock in “heavy users.”  Plenty of guilt to 
go around here!67 
Notwithstanding the culpability of the food industry in the obesity 
problem to date, there is much we can do to encourage the food industry to 
develop healthier products.  For example, First Lady Michelle Obama’s 
“Let’s Move!” campaign68 sends a signal to food producers and retailers 
that they need to engage in self-regulation or face the threat of bad 
publicity or worse.  In a previous article, I suggested that we develop a 
federal food classification and front-of-package labeling system that would 
classify foods as unhealthy, neutral, and healthy.69  This framework would 
create an economic incentive for food producers to reformulate foods and 
make them healthier.   
According to Friedman, the growth of the diet and weight loss industry 
is another laudable free market response to the obesity problem.70  In spite 
of the growth of the weight loss industry, however, the overwhelming 
majority of diets fail over the long run.71  It is easy to lose weight while 
staying at Miraval Resort, a controlled environment in which physical 
activity fills guests’ days and healthy, delicious food is served in small 
attractive portions.72  In the real world, however, our jobs are sedentary; 
our leisure time is short; and delicious, cheap, and convenient—albeit 
                                                                                                                          
66 Id. at 174–75, 184. 
67 Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Years after helping to develop Lunchables, 
Drane developed a different perspective; he now “holds the entire [food] industry accountable for the 
[obesity] epidemic.”  Id.  According to Drane, the epidemic is due to the “rise in corporate cooking, 
processed and preserved foods, often high in sugar/fat/salt/etc.  More calories in, less calories burned, 
obesity up.”  Id. 
68 About, LET’S MOVE!, http://www.letsmove.gov/about (last visited July 15, 2014).   
69 Pratt, supra note 44, at 138–40. 
70 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1722. 
71 See Pratt, supra note 44, at 116 (“[I]n the long run 95% of diets fail because, in the real world, 
food cues in the obesogenic food environment are ubiquitous and compelling, although often hidden.”). 
72 Miraval: An Overview, MIRAVAL, http://www.miravalresorts.com/overview/ (last visited July 
15, 2014). 
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unhealthy—foods and drinks are everywhere.73  In the obesogenic, real-
world food environment, maintaining a normal weight is challenging.74 
Although Friedman obviously is enamored with autonomy and free 
markets, he does not focus exclusively on autonomy, unlike some 
Libertarians.  A welfarist normative orientation is implicit throughout his 
article, although Friedman does not self-identify as a welfarist.75  Friedman 
seems willing to consider other normative goals and values, in addition to 
promoting autonomy, if doing so promotes social welfare.  For example, he 
expresses sympathy for the efforts of public health paternalists to reduce 
obesity-related morbidity and mortality.76  Also, Friedman concedes that it 
might be appropriate for the government to intervene to correct a market 
failure if the market correction will be effective.77  This concession turns 
out to be a straw man, however, because he doubts the effectiveness of 
most market interventions.   
Up to this point, Friedman’s views follow a familiar script, which 
implies that it might be better to leave consumer preferences and markets 
alone because regulators will make a mess of things.78  Critical Realists 
note that the “dispositional” orientation (i.e., the belief that consumers 
make their own “free,” independent decisions and are not affected by the 
situations in which they find themselves)79 is helpful to businesses, in part 
                                                                                                                          
73 See Pratt, supra note 44, at 94–95.   
74 See, e.g., BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK 27 
(2006) (“[W]eight loss [through dieting] is not mindless.  It’s like pushing a boulder uphill every 
second of every day.”).  Nutritionist Marian Nestle shares a similar observation about the American 
food environment: “Even if you know what is good for you, you are likely to have a hard time putting 
principles into practice. . . . [I]n America today . . . it is very, very hard not to overeat.”  MARION 
NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 11 (2006). 
75 Friedman describes his approach to developing advice for public health regulators:  
I note that moral justifications can be offered for different levels of paternalistic 
intervention, but I do not make normative prescriptions based on morality.  I advise 
using restraint and expecting modest results from regulatory intervention in public 
health, based on the reality of public attitudes toward paternalism and the 
complexity of the problem being addressed. 
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1697 n.40.   
76 See id. at 1711 (“[I]t can be difficult to discern where and how regulatory efforts can be 
deployed most efficiently and effectively to mitigate [obesity].”). 
77 See id. at 1720 (“[T]he analysis must focus on the strategies that the public will support, or at 
least not aggressively oppose.”). 
78 See id. at 1720–26 (discussing “apaternalistic” measures geared towards the obesity problem). 
79 Critical Realists Adam Benforado, David Yosifon, and Jon Hanson observe: 
[C]orporations, as entities, are largely justified as socially beneficial from the 
dispositionist perspective.  If consumers are assumed to be dispositional—that is, if 
they act according to a stable set of preferences that only they can assess directly—
then it follows naturally that the best way to maximize welfare is to allow consumers 
to satisfy their preferences through free markets.  It is through mutually beneficial 
transactions that otherwise invisible preferences are satisfied and overall social 
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because that orientation discourages the regulation of businesses to prevent 
harms to consumers: 
Markets, which allow the free exercise of dispositions, are 
understood to be more responsive to consumer preferences 
than regulators who lack good information and the 
appropriate incentives.  The dispositionist baseline translates 
to a presumption against regulatory intervention even against 
visible harms, for the actors involved are presumed to be 
choosing the inevitable risks that gave rise to those harms.  
Since the commercial interest merely responds to individual 
manifestations of choice, responsibility for bad outcomes—
the giant gut and the cellulite thighs—can be squarely placed 
on the consumer.  Regulatory intervention is warranted only 
in circumstances in which markets demonstrably fail to 
respond to consumer dispositions—for instance, when 
consumers clearly lack information or when a transaction 
creates significant negative externalities.  But, even in the 
presence of such market imperfections, calls for regulation 
may be rebutted on the grounds that imperfect markets are 
preferable to imperfect regulations.80 
Friedman goes on, however, to reach a conclusion that I found 
surprising at first.  Although he privileges autonomy, choices, and free 
markets, he ultimately counsels public health regulators to try to overcome 
the formidable political obstacles to public health paternalism by hiding 
public health paternalism—even highly coercive hard paternalism—so that 
Americans do not notice or feel the loss of autonomy.81  The only way that 
an autonomy-loving Libertarian could reach this conclusion is by adopting 
a welfarist normative stance, such as a utilitarian social welfare function, 
which trades off welfare gains from improved health against the minimal 
or nonexistent welfare loss caused by the hidden loss of autonomy.82  
Under this view, it is the feeling or mental state accompanying loss of 
                                                                                                                          
welfare is increased.  Profit is the substantiation of these welfare-enhancing 
transactions and is therefore, by definition, good. 
Benforado et al., supra note 59, at 1689. 
80 Id. at 1689–90.    
81 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1709, 1768.  According to Friedman, “The forgone autonomy is 
invisible or simply has no value.  If opportunities to deploy hidden paternalism emerge, they can be 
valuable for regulators to exploit.”  Id. at 1709. 
82 See id. at 1709 (suggesting that when a ban creates no visible reduction of individual choice, 
but results in enhanced individual welfare, it is a practical and beneficial solution); see also id. at 1691 
(stating that a common critique of libertarian paternalism is that it cannot be reconciled with state 
efforts to promote social welfare). 
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autonomy that creates a welfare loss, not the actual loss of autonomy.83  I 
found it difficult to reconcile this recommendation—that public health 
regulators should exploit hidden paternalism, even hard paternalism—with 
the dichotomy between autonomy and coercion that dominates the article 
as a whole.  From the beginning of the article, Friedman stakes out a 
position in favor of free market autonomy and against government 
coercion.  Throughout the article, he seems to disapprove of coercive 
public health paternalism that limits autonomy, and one of his main claims 
is that the public increasingly demands autonomy.84  
The “coercion spectrum,” which is the main theoretical construct that 
Friedman deploys in his article, classifies public health paternalistic 
measures based on the degree of government coercion involved.85  One 
could see why a Libertarian might distinguish between public health 
interventions based on degree of coercion, as Libertarians highly value 
autonomy, and coercion and autonomy are thought to be mutually 
exclusive.  Friedman’s theoretical classification system, however, is not 
actually doing the work of distinguishing between well-advised and ill-
advised forms of public health paternalism.  In addition, this “coercion 
spectrum” would not help a policymaker decide whether to adopt a specific 
public health proposal, regardless of where the proposed intervention is on 
the spectrum of hard paternalism to soft paternalism.   
Instead, I argue that a different sort of classification system is implicit 
in the public health examples Friedman uses.  The alternative classification 
system, developed by Mark Hall, classifies public health interventions 
based on whether the intervention:  
(1) narrowly targets “a specific, identifiable pathogen or discrete 
causal agent” that causes disease or death;  
(2) more broadly targets behavioral risk factors, such as obesity, that 
significantly contribute to chronic diseases and death; or  
(3) even more broadly targets ecological and societal factors, such 
as poverty and income inequality, that also significantly contribute 
to disease and death.86   
                                                                                                                          
83 See id. at 1747 (“[S]ome hard paternalistic initiatives can be implemented without triggering the 
perception of loss.  If the regulators eliminate a truly poor choice, there should be an opportunity for a 
welfare gain.”).  A “mental-state” conceptualization of welfare focuses on subjective well-being.  See, 
e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 29 
(2006) (“One type of mental-state view, pressed by Bentham, focuses on ‘pains’ and ‘pleasures,’ 
understood as positive and negative sensations or feelings.”). 
84 See Friedman, supra note 1 at 1754 (finding that people are hesitant when “regulators restrict 
personal choice” but they “applaud the addition of choice”).  
85 Id. at 1698–99. 
86 Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S199, 
S206 (2003). 
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Traditionally, public health law measures included only the first type 
of intervention.  This “old” public health focused on the control of 
infectious diseases, pathogens, and toxins; provision of uncontaminated 
drinking water and food; and sanitation facilities.87  To eliminate, reduce, 
or contain identifiable pathogens and toxins, public health authorities had 
police power to act, including the power to coerce; for example, public 
health authorities could order a quarantine to contain the spread of an 
infectious disease.88  In the context of fighting pathogens and infectious 
diseases, the use of public health power to coerce is understood as 
necessary, notwithstanding the fact that assertion of such power limits 
individual freedom.89 
“Old” public health interventions significantly reduced the incidence 
of many preventable causes of disease and death, resulting in an 
“epidemiological transition” in preventable causes of death.90  In today’s 
world, most preventable diseases and deaths are attributable to broader 
behavioral risk factors and ecological factors.  The goal of reducing 
preventable disease and death leads proponents of the “new” public health 
to suggest that public health law be used to reduce behavioral risk factors, 
including tobacco, alcohol, and drug use; unhealthy diet and activity 
patterns; and risky sexual behaviors.91  Recently, public health advocates 
have focused on anti-obesity public health measures as the “new frontier of 
public health law.”92  
The next Part of this Article considers the implications of applying (1) 
Friedman’s “coercion spectrum,” and (2) Hall’s “old” public health and 
“new” public health distinction, to the rule that limited the portion size of 
sugary drinks served in New York City food service establishments to 
sixteen ounces.  The portion cap rule, which was promulgated by the New 
York City Board of Health and subsequently invalidated by a New York 
court,93 is the main piece of evidence offered by Friedman to support his 
                                                                                                                          
87 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 9, 16–17 (2000) 
(describing the historical traditional approach to public health). 
88 Pratt, supra note 44, at 107. 
89 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of 
Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85, 85–87 (2003) (comparing the 
coercive public health measures adopted during the AIDS epidemic to proposed public health measures 
that might be adopted to respond to incidents of bioterrorism). 
90 Lawrence O. Gostin, Fast and Supersized: Is the Answer to Diet by Fiat?, 35 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 11, 11 (2005). 
91 Id. 
92 Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2601, 2601 (2006) (“The public health law approach posits that the law can be used to create 
conditions that allow people to lead healthier lives . . . [because] the government has both the power 
and the duty to regulate private behavior in order to promote public health.”). 
93 See infra Part IV.B.–C. 
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claim that anti-obesity public health paternalism “has peaked.”94  In my 
view, the judicial invalidation of the portion cap rule is much better 
explained by Hall’s construct than by Friedman’s coercion spectrum. 
IV.  THE SUGARY DRINK PORTION CAP EXAMPLE 
A.  The Promulgation of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule 
Reducing consumption of sugar-sweetened soda has been a focus of 
public health advocates for several decades.95  During the last decade, 
senior public health officials in New York City, under the leadership of 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, advocated for soda taxes to reduce soda 
consumption.96  Although support for such taxes was strong in the public 
health community, both the New York State Assembly and the New York 
City Council repeatedly considered and rejected proposals to tax or 
regulate the consumption of sodas and other sugary drinks.97  Although 
Mayor Bloomberg subsequently abandoned the proposed soda tax,98 public 
health advocates in the City continued to search for alternative means of 
reducing soda consumption.   
In a 2012 report, the New York City Obesity Task Force99 noted the 
                                                                                                                          
94 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1694. 
95 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited: The Federal 
Trade Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Regulate, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
98, 100 (2010) (discussing a failed attempt, during the late 1970s, to regulate soda and junk food 
television advertising directed towards children).  Michael Jacobson of the Center for Science in the 
Public Interest has been a longstanding advocate for public health measures to reduce soda 
consumption.  See MICHAEL F. JACOBSON, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, LIQUID CANDY: HOW 
SOFT DRINKS ARE HARMING AMERICANS’ HEALTH (2d ed. 2005), 
available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/liquid_candy_final_w_new_supplement.pdf.  In 2000, 
Jacobson and Kelly Brownell proposed a tax on sodas to discourage soda consumption and raise 
revenue for anti-obesity programs.  Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft 
Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854–57 (2000). 
96 See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention––The Public Policy 
Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 1806 (2009). 
97 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *5, *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 
970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (cataloguing various “sugary drink” proposals that the New York 
City Council and New York State Assembly considered and rejected).  
98 Anemona Hartocollis, City’s Health Commissioner, in a Medical Journal Article, Calls for a 
Tax on Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A22. 
99 Mayor Bloomberg convened the New York City Obesity Task Force and charged it with 
developing and recommending “innovative, aggressive solutions to address the obesity challenge in 
New York City.”  N.Y.C., REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE 
PLAN TO PREVENT AND CONTROL OBESITY 2 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE 
REPORT], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/otf_report.pdf.  The Task Force 
articulated four key goals for its work: (1) “Reduce obesity”; (2) “Address disparities between 
communities”; (3) “Reduce preventable health conditions”; and (4) “Create strategies to lower health 
care spending and lost productivity.”  Id. at 3.  The Task Force included commissioners from eleven 
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nutritional effects of increased consumption of sugar-sweetened soda: 
Americans consume about 200–300 more calories per day 
than 30 years ago, with the largest single increase due to 
sugar-sweetened drinks.  Nearly half of added sugar we 
consume is from sugar-sweetened drinks.  There also has 
been a significant increase in portion sizes over the past 
several decades.  The promotion of healthy eating includes 
decreasing the consumption of foods and beverages that are 
high in calories and nutrient poor and increasing the 
consumption of foods and beverages that are low in calories 
and nutrient rich.100 
Also expressing concern about higher rates of obesity and greater 
consumption of sugary drinks in poor neighborhoods and Black and Latino 
communities,101 the Task Force set a goal of reducing New Yorkers’ 
sugary drink consumption by thirty percent by 2016.102  The Task Force 
recommended that the city “[e]stablish a maximum size for sugary drinks 
in food service establishments”103 to reduce excessive consumption of 
sugary drinks.  The idea was that changing the default portion size for 
sugary drinks served in restaurants would make New Yorkers think more 
consciously about how much soda they are drinking and “reacquaint New 
Yorkers with ‘human size’ portions.”104 
Based upon the Task Force’s recommendation, Mayor Bloomberg 
proposed that the New York City Board of Health (the “Board of Heath” or 
“Board”)105 adopt the sugary drink portion cap proposal.106  The Board of 
Health published the proposed portion cap rule in the City Record, for 
comment, and on July 24, 2012, it held a public hearing on the proposed 
                                                                                                                          
diverse New York City agencies and representatives from the mayor’s office, including the city’s Food 
Policy Coordinator.  Id. at 2–3. 
100 Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted).  The Task Force noted that sugary drinks are “ubiquitous” and   
“are the leading items associated with excess intake of calories in adults.”  Id. at 5.  
101 See id. at 4 (noting that “the rate of overweight and obesity reaches 70 percent” in certain 
Black, Latino, and low-income communities in New York City). 
102 Id. at 7.   
103 Id. at 14. 
104 Id. 
105 The Board of Health is part of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
which is an executive branch agency with a public health orientation.  N.Y. Statewide Coal. of 
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 
WL 1343607, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013).  The ten 
members of the Board of Health and the chairperson are appointed by the Mayor.  Id.  Under the New 
York City Charter, five of the ten Board members must be medical doctors and the other five, if not 
doctors, must be experts in related scientific fields.  Id.  Dr. Thomas Farley, the Commissioner of the 
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, served as the Chairperson of the Board at 
the time the Board adopted the portion cap rule.  Id. at *3. 
106 Id. 
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rule.107  Following the hearing, the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene prepared a memorandum, dated September 6, 2012, 
for the Board of Health, summarizing and responding to comments and 
testimony that the Board received.108  On September 13, 2012, the Board 
met and adopted the sugary drink portion cap rule.109 
The sugary drink portion cap rule110 applied to some, but not all, New 
York City business establishments that serve sugary drinks.  It applied to 
“food service establishment[s],”111 including “restaurants, delis, fast-food 
franchises, movie theaters, stadiums and street carts, but not to grocery 
stores, convenience stores, 7-Elevens, corner markets, gas stations and 
other similar businesses.”112  The “sugary drinks”113 it regulated included 
sugar-sweetened sodas, energy drinks, and sweetened juices, but not 
potentially more caloric types of drinks, such as alcoholic beverages, fruit 
smoothies, milkshakes, and milky coffee drinks.114  Although the portion 
cap rule limited the size of the container in which sugary drinks could be 
served, it did not prohibit consumers from buying more than one sugary 
drink, refilling a drink container, or adding any quantity of sugar after 
purchasing a drink.115  Multiple plaintiffs challenged the soda portion cap 
and sought to enjoin its enforcement.116   
B.  The Invalidation of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule 
New York Supreme Court Judge Milton Tingling invalidated the 
sugary drink portion cap rule on the grounds that (1) it was “arbitrary and 
capricious,”117 and (2) the members of the Board of Health “exceeded their 
authority and impermissibly trespassed on legislative jurisdiction” when 
they promulgated the rule.118  Judge Tingling held that the portion cap rule 
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. at *4. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2013).  
111 Id. § 81.53(b). 
112 Verified Article 78 & Declaratory Judgment Petition at 3, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607 (No. 653584/12) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Petition].  
113 The rule defined “sugary drink” as a beverage that: “(A) [was] non-alcoholic; (B) [was] 
sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment with sugar or another caloric sweetener; (C) ha[d] 
greater than 25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of beverage; and (D) [did] not contain more than 50 percent 
of milk or milk substitute by volume as an ingredient.”  24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(a).   
114 Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 3. 
115 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6. 
116 Id. at *1.  The plaintiffs included the “New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce, The New York Korean-American Grocers Association, Soft Drink and Brewery Workers 
Union, Local 812, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, The National Restaurant Association, The 
National Association of Theatre Owners of New York State, and The American Beverage Association.”  
Id. 
117 Id. at *20. 
118 Id. at *6. 
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was “arbitrary and capricious” because the rule did not apply to soda sold 
by businesses other than “food service establishments,” did not apply to 
certain categories of highly caloric beverages and sugar-sweetened 
beverages, and permitted unlimited drink refills.119  These exceptions to the 
rule “effectively defeat[ed] the stated purpose of the Rule,” which was to 
reduce obesity.120 
Judge Tingling analyzed the separation of powers issue by applying 
Boreali v. Axelrod.121  In Boreali v. Axelrod, the New York Court of 
Appeals invalidated a rule, promulgated in 1987 by the New York State 
Public Health Council (“PHC”), which broadly prohibited indoor smoking 
in most public places, with specific enumerated exceptions.122  (The PHC 
adopted the rule after the state assembly rejected a broad indoor smoking 
ban and instead enacted a narrowly drawn indoor smoking ban.123)  Judge 
Titone, writing for a majority, articulated four “circumstances” that led the 
Court to conclude that the PHC had impermissibly usurped legislative 
power in promulgating the broad indoor smoking regulations: (1) the PHC 
balanced public health and “economic and social concerns,”124 as 
demonstrated by various exceptions (based on economic and political 
concerns) to the general rule promulgated; (2) the PHC promulgated the 
rule “on a clean slate,” with no “legislative guidance”;125 (3) the PHC acted 
“in an area in which the Legislature repeatedly had tried—and failed—to 
reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate and vigorous 
lobbying by a variety of interested factions”;126 and (4) the rule 
promulgated by the PHC did not require specialized public health 
“expertise or technical competence.”127   
In the case involving the sugary drink portion cap rule, Judge Tingling 
                                                                                                                          
119 Id. at *20. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at *8.  For an argument against the use of the Boreali framework to analyze the sugary 
drink portion cap rule, see Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion 
Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV. 
807, 842–44 (2013). 
122 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (N.Y. 1987).  The PHC promulgated the rules pursuant to the authority 
delegated to it by the New York State Legislature to regulate with respect to “matters affecting the 
security of life or health or the preservation and improvement of public health.”  Id. at 1358 (quoting 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225 (McKinney 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The PHC’s 
proposed rules would have prohibited smoking in schools, hospitals, retail stores, taxis and limousines, 
indoor workplace common areas, and restaurants with more than fifty seats.  Id. at 1352.  An exception 
to the indoor smoking prohibition applied to bars, to hotels, and to restaurants with fewer than fifty 
seats.  Id.  In addition, the rules provided that businesses that did not qualify for an exception to the 
indoor public smoking prohibition could apply for a waiver of the prohibition.  Id. 
123 Id. at 1357. 
124 Id. at 1355. 
125 Id. at 1356. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
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held that the rule violated the separation of powers doctrine based on the 
first three Boreali factors,128 because: (1) the exceptions to the sugary drink 
portion cap rule indicated that the Board of Health impermissibly balanced 
public health concerns and economic and political concerns;129 (2) the New 
York City Charter does not grant the Board “the authority to limit or ban a 
legal item under the guise of ‘controlling chronic disease,’”130 although it 
grants the Board the power to promulgate regulations “that prevent and 
protect against communicable, infectious, and pestilent diseases”;131 and 
(3) the New York City Council and New York State Assembly repeatedly 
had debated and rejected prior proposals to reduce consumption of sugary 
drinks.132  
C.  Friedman’s Interpretation of the Case 
The New York City sugary drink portion cap is Friedman’s prime 
example of “flashpoint zones,” which he defines as “high-profile clashes” 
that illustrate the recurring conflict between autonomy and coercive public 
health paternalism.133  Based on the New York portion cap example, he 
draws various conclusions about the limits of anti-obesity public health 
paternalism.  In addition, he argues that the limits of anti-obesity public 
health paternalism can be generalized and are applicable to all public 
health paternalism.134   
After considering the degree of coercion that the New York City 
portion cap entailed, Friedman places the portion cap on his “coercion 
spectrum” by classifying it as an “insulation strategy,” meaning that he 
views the portion cap as less coercive than a ban or mandate, but more 
coercive than strong-form debiasing (persuasive narratives about risks), 
weak-form debiasing (provision of neutral information about risks), and 
                                                                                                                          
128 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013).  Judge Tingling noted that the four Boreali “factors” are considered 
together, with no single “factor” being dispositive.  Id. at *7. 
129 Id. at *8–9.  The economic considerations that the Board of Health relied upon included the 
public costs of treating obesity.  Id. at *9.  The Board of Health also based the rule on political 
considerations by making no attempt to coordinate the portion cap rule with the New York State 
Department of Agriculture and Markets, despite a prior Memorandum of Understanding that required 
coordination between the two bodies.  Id. at *8–9. 
130 Id. at *16. 
131 Id. at *15.   
132 Id. at *18.  The portion cap rule did not violate the fourth Boreali factor, however, because the 
Board of Health held a hearing on the draft rule and used its “expertise or technical competence” to 
prepare a detailed memorandum, in which it discussed various medical and scientific studies.  Id. 
133 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1691–92. 
134 See id. at 1753–54 (generalizing his conclusions about the limits of anti-obesity paternalistic 
regulation to paternalistic regulation of marijuana and genetically-modified organisms). 
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free market apaternalism.135  Although he assumes that Mayor 
Bloomberg’s goal was “to insulate consumers from the effects of over-
imbibing” in sugary drinks,136 Friedman counters that “[t]he facts . . . did 
not support the notion that [the portion cap rule] would have any concrete 
effect.”137  In support of his argument, he refers to Judge Tingling’s 
conclusion that the portion cap rule “was arbitrary and capricious, exacting 
a burden without a reasonable basis.”138  
In his analysis of the implications of the case, Friedman observes that 
New Yorkers “overwhelmingly opposed this autonomy deprivation, even 
though the excessive consumption habit in question was only engaged in 
by a small part of the public.”139  Essentially, Friedman argues that the 
majority was not defending its own autonomy, but instead was defending 
the autonomy of the minority––and autonomy itself.  Based on the failure 
of the portion cap, he concludes that “the public increasingly” rejects 
paternalism as an unwarranted infringement of autonomy.140  His claim is 
that the “trend” toward public rejection of anti-obesity public health 
paternalism,141 especially “visible, hard paternalism,” significantly narrows 
the options that will be available to public health advocates to reduce the 
prevalence of obesity.142  He then generalizes his conclusion about anti-
obesity public health paternalism to other public health contexts, arguing:   
[Other] flashpoint zones show a general rejection of 
paternalism—especially visible, hard paternalism.  This 
leaves regulators with the more limited toolkit of soft 
paternalism to attack some of the more difficult public 
problems.  In fact, a rejection of hard paternalism can lead 
regulators either to use strategies that preserve autonomy, or 
simply to do nothing to regulate personal choices.143 
                                                                                                                          
135 See id. at 1738 (determining the category in which the portion cap rule should be placed). 
136 Id. at 1739. 
137 Id.  But see N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce  v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *19–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 
2013) (finding that the Board had a “reasonable basis” for adopting the rule, but that the rule as 
promulgated was “arbitrary and capricious”). 
138 Friedman, supra note 1, at 1739. 
139 Id. at 1740.  Friedman stresses that the public rejected the portion cap notwithstanding the fact 
that it “was mostly directed at others and targeted at a narrow category and manner of consumption.”  
Id. at 1741.  He reiterates that “a broad segment of [New Yorkers] objected to this kind of paternalism, 
even though the regular consumption of large sweetened drinks was limited to a small subset of 
consumers.”  Id. at 1690. 
140 Id. at 1757; see also id. at 1744 (“The reaction to the [portion cap] indicates that the public 
attitude toward paternalism in contexts involving private consumption decisions may be trending 
negative.”). 
141 Id. at 1719. 
142 Id. at 1692. 
143 Id. 
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Friedman thus makes the broad claim that “[p]aternalism has peaked, for 
now, in the realm of public health regulation.”144  
D.  An Alternative Interpretation of the Case 
What does the failure of the sugary drink portion cap teach us about 
anti-obesity public health paternalism or about public health paternalism in 
general?  In my view, not exactly what Friedman claims it does.  An 
alternative interpretation of the New York City portion cap rule case is that 
it illustrates the difference between (1) old public health interventions that 
target specific pathogens or toxins, and (2) new public health interventions 
that target upstream behavioral risk factors.  In the context of old public 
health interventions, public health regulators can easily justify their 
interventions—even highly coercive, paternalistic interventions.  In the 
context of new public health interventions, however, public health 
regulators face an uphill battle to justify their public health interventions—
even much less coercive interventions, such as “nudges.”  This is 
especially true where the public health regulators take unilateral regulatory 
action without the guidance from the relevant legislative bodies or—worse 
yet—in spite of the prior rejection of arguably similar interventions by 
those legislative bodies.  
Despite the invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap rule, public 
health regulators in New York continue to have extensive power with 
respect to old public health interventions, including interventions to 
contain the spread of infectious disease or to promote food and water 
purity and sanitation.  With respect to old public health interventions, 
public health regulators can promulgate rules that are located at any point 
on Friedman’s coercion spectrum.  For example, even highly coercive, 
hard paternalistic interventions to eliminate deadly E. coli bacteria from 
the food supply are widely considered to be appropriate and 
uncontroversial.145  No one seriously argues that autonomy requires that 
consumers be free to ingest E. coli; it is a pathogen and the first mission for 
public health regulators of food is to ensure food safety.146  The traditional 
powers of the Board, however, do not include the power to create new 
                                                                                                                          
144 Id. at 1694. 
145 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that the New York City Board of Health has the power to “call 
for any [disease-causing] food to be destroyed”).  For a list of recent outbreaks of foodborne illness in 
the United States, see CAROLINE SMITH DEWAAL & MARCUS GLASSMAN, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. 
INTEREST, OUTBREAK ALERT! 2001–2010: A REVIEW OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN AMERICA 6 (2013), 
available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/outbreak_alert_2013_final.pdf. 
146 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *16 
(stating that the Board of Health may “supervise and regulate the food supply of the City when it affects 
public health”). 
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public health interventions to reduce unhealthy behavioral “risk factors.”147   
What anti-obesity public health regulators fail to recognize is that new 
public health interventions are much more controversial and difficult to 
justify.148  To explore the difference between old and new public health 
interventions, compare: (1) recent public health interventions to ban or 
regulate substances that have been shown to be pathogenic or toxic, 
including lead, trans fats, and tobacco; and (2) the New York City sugary 
drink portion cap.  The development of public health regulation of lead, 
trans fats, and tobacco follows a similar chronology: the substance initially 
was assumed to be safe; medical researchers hypothesized that the 
substance, in fact, might be toxic; studies analyzed that hypothesis; results 
of early studies were inconclusive; later studies proved an association 
between the substance and certain specific negative health effects; and, 
eventually, medical researchers established that the substance was toxic or 
pathogenic.149  As evidence accumulated, public health interventions to 
regulate the substance became increasingly proactive, interventionist, and 
coercive.  Now that researchers have proven the health risks of ingesting 
small quantities of lead or trans fats and of smoking or chewing tobacco, 
the public is insulated from those risks by way of bans, labeling 
                                                                                                                          
147 Hall, supra note 86, at S206; see N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 
2013 WL 1343607, at *14 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that amendments to the New York City 
Charter significantly expanded the power of the Board of Health to address broader public health 
issues).  Judge Tingling stated: “[I]n looking at the history of the Charter, the intention of the 
legislature with respect to the Board of Health is clear.  It is to protect the citizens of the city by 
providing regulations that prevent and protect against communicable, infectious, and pestilent 
diseases.”  Id. at *15. 
148 Pratt, supra note 44, at 108–09.  In a previous article, I offered public health advocates some 
suggestions for developing and refining anti-obesity public health proposals: (1) distinguish between 
the public health goal of obesity reduction, the public health goal of improved nutrition, and other 
specific public health goals; (2) understand the implications of using an “externalities” justification to 
support anti-obesity measures; (3) understand the implications of using an “internalities” justification to 
support anti-obesity measures; (4) distinguish between “old” public health interventions that target 
specific pathogens or toxins and “new” public health interventions that target upstream behavioral risk 
factors; (5) offer empirical support for assumptions upon which public health proposals are based; 
(6) explore the possible and likely intended and unintended consequences of the measure, considering 
the benefits, costs, inefficiencies, and potential unfairness caused by the intervention; (7) consider 
competing goals and values in addition to the anti-obesity public health goal; and (8) develop a 
reasonable form of performance review for the intervention.  See generally id.  Perhaps some of these 
suggestions could have helped the Task Force develop an alternate proposal for reducing the 
consumption of sugary drinks, or at least articulate a more specific policy rationale for the portion cap 
rule that better fit the predictable consequences of the rule.   
149 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1707–08 (summarizing the chronology of the ban on lead 
in paint); Artificial Trans Fat: A Timeline, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT., 
http://cspinet.org/transfat/timeline.html (last visited July 15, 2014) (summarizing the chronology of 
trans fat labeling and bans). 
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requirements, or restrictions on use.150 
Compare the sugary drink portion cap rule.  Soda is not a toxin and is 
not per se “inherently dangerous.”  The sugary drink portion cap rule thus 
is a new public health intervention, not an old public health intervention to 
eliminate or reduce exposure to a pathogen or toxin.  Research cited by the 
Board indicates that “excessive” consumption of sugary drinks is a 
behavioral risk factor that contributes to obesity, diabetes, and various 
other serious medical conditions.151  Although use of the word “excessive” 
might at first seem subjective and judgmental, there is empirical support 
for the Task Force characterizing consumption of super-sized sodas as 
“excessive.”  According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, “refined 
sugars should provide no more than 6 to 10 percent of . . . total daily 
calories,” to reserve enough calories for consuming the recommended 
servings of various types of foods.152  For example, a teenager whose 
recommended daily caloric intake is 2200 calories should not consume 
more than twelve teaspoons of sugar per day.153  The average teenage boy 
who drinks soda (or similar sugary drinks) consumes twenty-five ounces 
per day, which includes over twenty teaspoons of sugar.154  
Consuming such “excessive” refined sugar leads to one of two 
outcomes, both of which are detrimental to health: (1) if a soda drinker 
consumes soda in addition to consuming other foods and beverages that 
meet recommended dietary guidelines, the individual will gain weight; or 
(2) if a soda drinker avoids weight gain by reducing consumption of foods 
that meet recommended dietary guidelines, the individual will lack 
essential nutrients.  Empirical evidence establishes: (1) “foods and 
beverages high in added sugars are displacing more nutrient-rich foods in 
the American diet;”155 (2) “[a] remarkably lower percentage of [heavy 
consumers of added sugars] met their RDA for many micronutrients;”156 
and (3) “disproportionately high percentages of lower-income Americans 
(40 percent) and African Americans (44 percent) were heavy consumers of 
                                                                                                                          
150 See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO: A 
SUMMARY (2009), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fda-
summary.pdf (discussing federal bans on tobacco products). 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 100–06; see also Marcello, supra note 121, at 819–22 
(discussing the New York City Board of Health’s reasoning in enacting the portion cap rule). 
152 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 4. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at ii; see The Nutrition Source, How Sweet Is It? Calories and Teaspoons                                   
of Sugar in 12 Ounces of Each Beverage (2009), http://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/30/2012/10/how-sweet-is-it-color.pdf (stating that there are ten teaspoons of sugar 
in twelve ounces of non-diet carbonated colas). 
155 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 6.  “As teens have doubled or tripled their consumption of soft 
drinks, they have cut their consumption of milk by more than 40%.”  Id. at 5. 
156 Id. at 7. 
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added sugars.”157  Put differently, “soft drinks pose health risks both 
because of what they contain (extra calories, sugar, and various additives) 
and what they replace in the diet (beverages and foods that provide 
vitamins, minerals, and other nutrients).”158  Although the Task Force 
focused on obesity reduction, its goal of reducing the empty calories from 
soda also incorporates the important but distinct public health goal of 
improving nutrition.159  Thus, the Obesity Task Force had a dual goal of 
reducing both the obesity and the malnutrition that are attributable to the 
consumption of large quantities of sugary drinks. 
The stated goal of the rule, as articulated by the Obesity Task Force 
and the Board of Health, was to reduce obesity.160  Judge Tingling 
concluded that the rule was “arbitrary and capricious,” in part because the 
portion cap rule did not apply to alcoholic beverages or to some sugary 
drinks, such as milky coffee drinks, milkshakes, and fruit smoothies, which 
are even more caloric than the drinks the portion cap rule regulated.161  
Also, the portion cap rule allowed unlimited sugary drink refills and did 
not prevent consumers from adding any quantity of sugar to their drinks.162  
With so many seemingly inexplicable exceptions and loopholes, all of 
which were inconsistent with the anti-obesity goal that the Board of Health 
offered to justify the rule, Judge Tingling expressed concern that the 
benefits of the portion cap rule would not materialize, much less justify the 
costs of the rule.163   
The Board could have done a better job of informing Judge Tingling of 
the reasonable basis for the seemingly arbitrary and capricious application 
of the portion cap rule to some sugary drinks, but not others.164  The Board 
could have argued effectively that sodas and similar sugary drinks “are a 
special problem.”165  If Judge Tingling had a better understanding of why 
some drinks were covered by the rule but other drinks were not, he may 
not have concluded that the rule was arbitrary and capricious.  “Sugary 
drinks,” as defined by the portion cap rule, were the target of the 
intervention for a variety of specific reasons, including the following: (1) 
reducing the consumption of sugary drinks, especially those that are 
aggressively marketed to children, has been a continuing focus of public 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 9. 
159 N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 12. 
160 See supra notes 99, 106 and accompanying text. 
161 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6, *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013). 
162 Id. at *8. 
163 Id. at *6. 
164 See Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 3 (discussing the portion cap rule’s inclusion of 
certain sugary drinks and detailing excluded beverages). 
165 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 12. 
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health proposals since the late 1970s;166 (2) sugar-sweetened soda is 
disproportionately consumed in poor neighborhoods in which the 
prevalence of obesity and Type II diabetes rates is disproportionately 
high;167 (3) sugary drinks contain only “empty calories,”168 whereas drinks 
that contain mostly milk or fruit, along with added sugar, at least have 
some nutritional value;169 (4) sugary drinks are aggressively marketed by 
beverage companies;170 (5) children, especially teens, are deficient in 
calcium and other important nutrients, in part because they typically drink 
soda instead of milk and juice, which increases the risk of osteoporosis and 
broken bones;171 (6) high fructose corn syrup, a sugar syrup that is 
commonly used in drinks that are subject to the portion cap, may have 
more negative health effects than other types of sugars, such as the sugars 
in milk, fruits, and vegetables;172  (7) sugary drinks, as opposed to drinks 
containing milk or whole fruit, do not make us feel “full” and do not 
reduce our overall intake of calories;173 and (8) sugary drink consumption 
also may increase the risk of dental caries, kidney stones, and heart 
disease.174  
Also, sugary drinks are one of few specific, easily identifiable 
categories of nutrient-poor, caloric foods or drinks that make up a double-
                                                                                                                          
166 See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Reducing Childhood Obesity Through Policy Change: Acting 
Now to Prevent Obesity, 29 HEALTH AFF. 357, 359 (2010) (discussing children’s exposure to 
“extensive marketing and promotion of food items”); see also Gretchen Goetz, Three Studies Link 
Sugary Drinks to Weight Gain, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/09/sugary-drinks-get-the-one-two-three-punch-from-obesity-
research/#.U01v6PldUVw (describing research that has been conducted regarding sugary drink 
consumption since the late 1970s). 
167 N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 8, 13. 
168 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 8. 
169 See id. at 19, 26 (comparing soft drinks to healthful foods). 
170 See id. at 19–23 (describing aggressive marketing strategies used by beverage companies to 
market their products and providing estimates of amounts beverage companies spend on advertising); 
see also HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, FACT SHEET: SUGARY DRINK SUPERSIZING                           
AND THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC 1 (2012), available at http://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/30/2012/10/sugary-drinks-and-obesity-fact-sheet-june-2012-the-nutrition-
source.pdf (“Beverage companies in the US spent roughly $3.2 billion marketing carbonated beverages 
in 2006, with nearly a half billion dollars of that marketing aimed directly at youth ages 2–17.  And 
each year, youth see hundreds of television ads for sugar-containing drinks.  In 2010, for example, 
preschoolers viewed an average of 213 ads for sugary drinks and energy drinks, while children and 
teens watched an average of 277 and 406 ads, respectively.  Yet the beverage industry aggressively 
rebuffs suggestions that its products and marketing tactics play any role in the obesity epidemic.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
171 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 13. 
172 See id. at 11–12 (discussing the contribution of high fructose corn syrup to weight gain and 
obesity). 
173 See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 14 (discussing the increased 
intake of calories in relation to feeling full after consuming sugary drinks).  High-protein foods and 
drinks and high-fiber foods and drinks create a full feeling, but sugary sodas do not. 
174 JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 14–16. 
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digit percentage of American caloric intake.175  The extraordinarily large 
aggregate volume of “sugary drinks” consumed by Americans, especially 
children and teenage boys and girls, makes sugary drinks a prominent 
target for obesity reduction.176  The idea is that sugary drinks provide a 
simple, identifiable point of leverage against obesity; put simply, public 
health regulators think that eliminating or significantly reducing soda 
consumption could reverse recent increases in obesity.177   
In addition to better articulating the reasoning for specifically targeting 
sugary soda and similar nutrient-poor, caloric sugary beverages, the Board 
could have better explained the reasoning for using a portion cap to try to 
reduce soda consumption.178  Imposing a portion cap on soda was 
motivated by two separate public health goals: (1) countering the fast food 
industry super-sizing trend; and (2) reducing excessive consumption of 
nutrient-poor, caloric sugary drinks.  Portion sizes of “sugary drinks” have 
increased dramatically in the last thirty years.179  Super-sized sugary drinks 
increase beverage industry profits because consumers focus myopically on 
the salient aspect of added value, without understanding the subtle way in 
which their caloric intake and, in the long run, their weight increases.180  In 
other words, larger portion sizes increase caloric consumption without 
consumers realizing that that their caloric intake has significantly 
increased.181  Among high calorie drinks, sodas are sold in super-sized 
                                                                                                                          
175 Id. at 1, 10 (“Carbonated soft drinks are the single most-consumed food in the American 
diet . . . .”). 
176 See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 12 (articulating an initiative to 
“[e]ncourage [h]ealthy [e]ating” by focusing on the reduction of New Yorkers’ consumption of sugary 
drinks); see also JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 1–3 (documenting large quantities of sugary drinks that 
are consumed in the United States and particularly noting the soda consumption by children, teenagers, 
and young adults). 
177 See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 7 (discussing the implementation 
of initiatives that would reduce the prevalence of obesity, including reducing sugary beverage 
consumption). 
178 Having ruled out soda taxes, the Obesity Task Force and Board of Health focused on 
establishing a maximum portion size for sugary drinks that would counter the super-sizing trend for 
sugary drinks.  Id. at 14.  Brian Galle argues that “nudges” can be more efficient than traditional 
interventions, such as Pigouvian taxes.  See Brian D. Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating 
the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 857–59 (2014) (explaining why nudges can work and what 
they depend on).  One of the advantages of the New York City sugary drink portion cap was the way in 
which the rule specifically targeted the problematic overconsumption of soda, instead of 
indiscriminately subjecting all consumption to regulation or taxation.  See id. at 885 (explaining that the 
New York City Health Department targeted soda for the portion cap because “soda contributes 
significantly to obesity” and that “[s]ize limits are better targeted at soda-drinkers’ potential 
internalities than a tax would be”). 
179 See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 13 (illustrating “Exploding 
Beverage Sizes” with a graph demonstrating 457% growth in drink size). 
180 See JACOBSON, supra note 95, at 3 (providing sample pricing for smaller portions of drinks and 
larger, value-added portions of drinks). 
181 See WANSINK, supra note 74, at 69–70 (noting that the serving size bias affects caloric 
consumption even if the consumers have been educated about serving size bias and concluding that 
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containers more often than other high calorie drinks that Judge Tingling 
mentioned in the opinion (e.g., milkshakes).182  According to the Obesity 
Task Force, the portion cap rule would “reacquaint New Yorkers with 
‘human size’ portions to reduce excessive consumption of sugary 
drinks.”183   
The sugary drink portion cap was supposed to gently tip the scales 
back toward less gargantuan portion sizes for nutrient-poor, caloric sugary 
beverages.  Although Judge Tingling seemed to think that allowing refills 
would prevent the portion cap from being effective,184 he did not 
understand that the portion cap was not designed to be a “ban” that 
prevented consumers from drinking more than sixteen ounces of soda; it 
was supposed to reduce consumption more subtly by framing sixteen 
ounces as a normal portion size and making consumers stop and think 
about whether they actually want to drink more than sixteen ounces of 
soda.185  If Judge Tingling had better understood the reasoning behind the 
sugary drink portion cap rule, he may not have concluded that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
The portion cap rule nonetheless would have been invalidated because 
                                                                                                                          
“[n]o one is immune to serving-size norms––not even ‘intelligent, informed’ people who have been 
lectured on the subject ad nauseum”).  “In the end, setting the table with the wrong dinner plates or 
serving bowls—the big ones—sets the stage for overeating.  And there are heavyweight 
consequences . . . .”  Id.   
182 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce  v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2013) (listing caloric drinks that are not subject to the sugary drink portion 
cap rule). 
183 N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 99, at 14. 
184 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *6 
(observing that “no restrictions exist on refills further defeating the Rule’s state purpose”). 
185 See id. at *6, *8 (explaining that the portion cap does not “preclude unlimited free refills or 
multiple purchases of 16-oz. beverages or providing unlimited sugars after purchase . . . but does limit 
the containers at self service fountains to be limited to 16 oz irrespective of whether a consumer is 
purchasing water or one of the non-regulated drinks”).  The Obesity Task Force or Board of Health 
could have reduced the costs of the sugary drink portion cap rule by limiting drink containers to a size 
just smaller than the truly super-sized thirty-two and sixty-four ounce drinks.  The standard size 
container for a bottled soda is twenty ounces, although a 16.9 ounce container also is widely used.  See 
Mike Esterl, Coke Tailors Its Soda Sizes—Backing Off of “Supersizing,” Company Aims for Wider 
Range of Ounces, Prices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2011, at B4 (describing Coke’s launch of new bottle 
sizes “represent[ing] a departure from years of relying heavily on three basic packages—20-ounce 
bottles in convenience stores and two-liter bottles and cases of 12-ounce cans in supermarkets”).  
Imposing a sixteen ounce container limit would require bottlers of sugary drinks to reconfigure their 
molds and production processes, at great expense to them.  Perhaps the implicit goal of the portion cap 
rule was to require exactly this type of container reformulation in order to shift standard soda portion 
sizes back toward the smaller portion sizes of years past.  The costs of forcing bottlers and distributors 
to reconfigure their production processes might be quite disproportionate when compared to the 
benefits of reducing the standard drink portion size by either .9 ounces (from 16.9 ounces to sixteen 
ounces), or by four ounces (from twenty ounces to sixteen ounces). 
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of the extent to which the Board attempted to usurp legislative power.186 
Going forward, this aspect of the portion cap case presents a formidable 
barrier to promulgation of new public health regulations by the Board of 
Health.  Boreali v. Axelrod seemingly does not permit a New York 
administrative agency to take into consideration any “ends” that might 
conflict with the ends that the agency is charged to pursue.  The Board of 
Health, which is charged with maximizing the health of New Yorkers, 
violates Boreali if the Board takes into account any political or economic 
considerations in fashioning a public health rule.  
There is an irony implicit in the Boreali test.  The first Boreali factor 
considers “whether the challenged regulation is based upon concerns not 
related to the stated purpose of the regulation, i.e., is the regulation based 
on other factors such as economic, political or social concerns?”187  The 
only way that an executive agency can avoid running afoul of this factor is 
to myopically disregard information other than information that pertains 
directly to the agency’s charge, for example the Board of Health’s charge 
to promote health.  An administrative agency’s weighing of competing 
interests, such as “economic, political or social” considerations,188 is a 
factor that counts against the agency in the Boreali analysis.189  The idea is 
that the legislature has the power to balance such competing interests, but 
an administrative agency does not have that power.190   
In a previous article, I advised public health advocates to examine 
critically the empirical assumptions upon which their new public health 
proposals rest, and consider carefully both the intended and unintended 
consequences of their proposals.191  In effect, my suggestion is that public 
health advocates perform, at a minimum, a rough, qualitative form of cost-
benefit analysis.192  Performing such an analysis, which requires a 
                                                                                                                          
186 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 
(expressing grave concerns about the portion cap rule eviscerating the separation of powers doctrine). 
187 Id. at *8. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. at *8–9 (noting that “the statement of financial costs related to the chronic epidemic 
further evidences a balancing being struck between safeguarding the public’s health and economic 
considerations,” and holding that such balancing “violates the first prong of Boreali”). 
190 See id. at *16 (“It is the province of the people’s elected representatives, rather than appointed 
administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among competing interests.” 
(quoting Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
191 Pratt, supra note 44, at 75 (arguing that public health advocates should consider both intended 
and unintended consequences of public health interventions, including soda taxes). 
192 According to Adler and Posner: 
[Cost-Benefit Analysis] is a procedure that measures the impact of agency choice on 
a plurality of aspects of human welfare using a money scale.  Frequently, however, 
agencies compare the welfare “costs” and “benefits” of their choices in a more 
qualitative way.  Policy effects will be described, and indeed might be quantified on 
various scales (for example, numbers of deaths, . . . jobs lost or gained), but no 
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balancing of competing costs and benefits, appears to be prohibited under 
Boreali.  The Boreali separation of powers objection would seem to apply 
to any new public health interventions that balance competing goals, 
because Boreali stands for the proposition that such balancing more 
properly is the subject of legislative decision-making. 
If a statute enacted by the legislature specified that the Board of Health 
(in New York City, or the Public Health Council in New York State) could 
balance competing interests to reduce the prevalence of obesity and 
diabetes and provided some guidelines for performing such balancing, 
Boreali may not bar the Board from promulgating new public health 
regulations.  In the portion cap case, however, the Board promulgated the 
rule without any legislative guidance.  Not only was the Board operating 
on a “clean slate,” with no legislative guidance,193 it acted in 
contraventionone might even say defianceof the City Council’s 
rejection of soda taxes and soda regulation proposals, as well as the overt, 
public disapproval of certain members of the City Council.194  Judge 
Tingling endorsed the view expressed in the petitioners’ brief that the 
Board’s promulgation of the sugary drink portion cap rule was designed as 
an “end-run” around the legislature.195  That aspect of the rule 
promulgation was fatal.196  Judge Tingling concluded that the Board’s 
actions exceeded their power to act: “To accept [the Board’s] interpretation 
of the authority granted to the Board by the New York City Charter would 
leave its authority to define, create, mandate and enforce limited only by its 
imagination.”197  
Under a literal interpretation of Boreali and the sugary drink portion 
cap case, a public health regulation promulgated by the New York Board 
of Health without prior legislative guidance or subsequent ratification by 
the City Council cannot survive a separation of powers challenge unless 
                                                                                                                          
monetary scale for commensurating all these impacts will be deployed.  Instead, the 
trade-off will be done more intuitively.  
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 83, at 73.  
193 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *17, 
*28–29 (noting that an agency writes on a clean slate when it “creates its own set of comprehensive 
rules without the benefit of legislative guidance” and concluding that amendments to the New York 
City Charter did not provide legislative guidance regarding agency regulation of legal unadulterated 
foods to control chronic diseases). 
194 See Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 112, at 1, 30 (noting the “public objection of 17 members of 
the City Council” to the sugary drink portion cap rule). 
195 See id. at 1 (arguing that the portion cap rule was “imposed by executive fiat [and] usurps the 
role of the City Council” and that “[t]he proposal was immediately recognized for what it was an 
end-run around the City Council”). 
196 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343507, at *20 
(indicating that the Board’s promulgation of the portion cap rule violated separation of powers 
doctrine). 
197 Id. 
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the regulation pertains to an imminent, discrete, per se public health hazard 
or threat.  Also, in developing and promulgating rules, the New York 
Board of Health must focus exclusively on maximizing health (i.e., it is 
prohibited from balancing public health and economic or political ends), 
unless the legislature has delegated to the Board the authority to engage in 
such balancing and has specified the manner in which the Board is to 
perform such balancing of competing ends.  Boreali, in effect, 
conceptualizes an administrative agency as performing only the ministerial 
work of filling in the blanks of a statute, in a manner specified by the 
legislature, instead of forming and implementing specific policies to 
further the broad policy goals delegated to the agency by the legislature.   
Beyond New York, state and local public health agencies that are not 
hamstrung by Boreali probably have much greater latitude to continue to 
develop and promulgate new anti-obesity regulations.  For example, the 
public health agencies in Boston and in Washington State, which like the 
New York City Board of Health have promulgated public health 
interventions that target chronic diseases including obesity, may continue 
to proactively innovate in the interest of public health.198 
Public health regulators in New York City and elsewhere remain free 
to independently promulgate old public health regulations (including 
highly coercive regulations) that reduce or eliminate a specific pathogen or 
toxin.  Eventually, research may establish that sugary drinks (or potentially 
certain “doses” of sugary drinks) are pathogenic or toxic, similar to lead, 
trans fats, and tobacco.199  If proof develops, as it did for lead, trans fats, 
and tobacco, public health regulators will have greater power to regulate 
soda.  Until they have that proof, however, they will face an uphill battle if 
they continue to adopt unilateral new public health regulationseven 
interventions that are not very coercive—to reduce soda consumption.  For 
now, public health advocates appear to overreach when they say that soda 
                                                                                                                          
198 See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, The Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of 
Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1879, 1882 (2013) (describing regulatory actions of 
the Boston Public Health Commission, an independent state agency, and the King County-Seattle 
Board of Public Health, an agency that enacts some of the most aggressive public health regulations). 
199 See Lori Dorfman et al., Soda and Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility 
Campaigns: How Do They Compare?, 9 PLOS MED., June 2012, at 5 (concluding that “[e]merging 
science on the addictiveness and toxicity of sugar, especially when combined with the addictive 
properties of caffeine found in many sugary beverages, should further heighten awareness of the 
product’s public health threat similar to the understanding about the addictiveness of tobacco 
products”).  See generally Robert H. Lustig et al., The Toxic Truth About Sugar, 482 NATURE 27, 28, 
29 (2012) (advocating that sugarspecifically soda and other sugary beveragesshould be regulated, 
proposing that the justifications for alcohol regulation“unavoidability (or pervasiveness throughout 
society), toxicity, potential for abuse and negative impact on society”apply to sugar, and pointing to 
“successful . . . control strategies” for tobacco and alcohol that can serve as “[a] reasonable parallel for 
sugar”). 
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must be regulated like lead in paint.200 
Make no mistake: the invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap case 
was a significant defeat for the New York City Board of Health and will 
make it much more difficult, going forward, for the Board to promulgate 
new public health regulation.  The defeat of the portion cap rule does not 
signal the end of public health paternalism, however.  In the future, the 
Board simply will have to do a better job of advocating for its new public 
health proposals to garner the support of the City Council and the public.   
Local public health agencies that are not subject to the severe rule 
promulgation restrictions imposed by Boreali v. Axelrod will have greater 
freedom to promulgate new public health regulations without advance 
legislative approval.  They nonetheless should clearly articulate the values 
that motivate their proposals, to enlist the support of legislators and the 
public. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Making the food environment less obesogenic will require government 
intervention, or at least a plausible threat that government will intervene if 
the food and beverage industry does not rein in obesity.  As I have 
indicated in a previous article, I support anti-obesity interventions that 
meet performance standards.  Public health advocates should recognize, 
however, that new public health interventions to reduce obesity raise 
heightened objections about the executive branch usurping legislative 
power to the exclusion of competing goals.  Mayor Bloomberg’s 
administration and public health regulators in New York are to be 
commended for their good intentions, their passion for improving the 
health of New Yorkers, and their development of innovative 
interventions—some of which have turned out to be effective.   
The invalidation of the sugary drink portion cap rule is a serious 
setback for the New York Board of Health. The portion cap case and the 
reassertion of the strict administrative constraints imposed by Boreali v. 
Axelrod will hamper the ability of the New York Board of Health to 
promulgate innovative anti-obesity regulations without the approval of the 
legislature.  The case demonstrates the significant risk of unilateral 
adoption by public health regulators of new public health interventions.  
Going forward, public health advocates—especially public health 
advocates in New York—will need to do a better job of advocating for 
their goals and involving the legislature and the public.  I recommend that 
                                                                                                                          
200 See, e.g., David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Why It Took Decades of Blaming                       
Parents Before We Banned Lead Paint, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/04/why-it-took-decades-of-blaming-parents-before-
we-banned-lead-paint/275169/ (advocating that public health agencies not delay soda regulation, based 
on lessons learned from delaying lead paint regulation). 
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smaller scale pilot projects be used to test anti-obesity interventions that 
show promise and to establish the costs and benefits of proposed 
interventions.  The interventions that are most successful can generate 
legislative proposals that are supported by empirical research.  Anti-obesity 
public health advocates should: (1) clarify their multiple public health 
goals and articulate them clearly; (2) develop proposals that are a good fit 
for the goals articulated; (3) consider both intended and unintended 
consequences of the proposals; and (4) try to build consensus for the most 
promising proposals.   
Although the portion cap case prohibits New York public health 
agencies from balancing public health goals and competing economic and 
political ends, the legislature is free to balance competing concerns.  In 
New York, and even in jurisdictions in which public health agencies have 
greater latitude to innovate without legislative authorization, I urge anti-
obesity public health regulators to build the empirical case for specific 
anti-obesity interventions and take their argument to the public and the 
legislature.  The sugary drink portion cap case shows that, at least in New 
York, courts will invalidate rules that implement unilateral new public 
health interventionshighly coercive or otherwiseand are promulgated 
by an executive agency as an end-run around uncooperative legislators.  
Instead of defying the legislature, public health paternalists everywhere 
should make such a compelling case for public health interventions that 
even uncooperative legislators cannot in good conscience refuse. 
Ultimately, Friedman and I reach slightly different conclusions about 
the future of anti-obesity public health paternalism: he is pessimistic and 
sees the glasssixteen-ounce or otherwiseas half empty, while I am 
optimistic and see it as half full. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
The New York Supreme Court Appellate Division 
decision cited in this Article was affirmed by the New 
York Court of Appeals in N.Y. Statewide Coalition of 
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Department 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681 (2014), 
after this Article was selected for publication. 
 
